In this work, we propose a probabilistic value-passing CCS (Calculus of Communicating System) approach to model and analyze a typical network security scenario with one attacker and one defender. By minimizing this model with respect to probabilistic bisimulation and abstracting it through graph-theoretic methods, two algorithms based on backward induction are designed to compute Nash Equilibrium strategy and Social Optimal strategy respectively. For each algorithm, the correctness is proved and an implementation is realized. Finally, this approach is illustrated by a detailed case study.
INTRODUCTION
Modeling and analysis of network security has been a hot research spot in the network security domain. It has been studied from different perspectives. Among them are two main approaches, one based on game-theoretic methods [15] , and one based on (probabilistic) process algebra [13, 22, 4] . In the later 1990's, game theoretic methods were introduced for modeling and analyzing network security [21] . These methods consist in applying different kinds of games to different network scenarios with one attacker and one defender [17] . Roughly speaking, static game is a one-shot game in which players choose action simultaneously. It is often used to model the scenarios in which the attacker and defender have no idea on the action chosen by the adversary (for instance the scenario of information warfare), and to compute the best strategy for players in a quantitative way [9] . Stochastic game is often used to model the scenarios which involve probabilistic transitions through states of network systems according to the actions chosen by the attacker and the defender [10, 12] . Markov game is an extension of game theory to MDP-like environments [23] . It is often used to model the scenarios in which the future offensive-defensive behaviors will impact on the present action choice of attacker and defender [24] . In Bayesian game, the characteristics about other players is incomplete and players use Bayesian analysis in predicting the outcome [7] . A dynamic Bayesian game with two players, called Signaling game, is often used to model intrusion detection in mobile ad-hoc networks and to analyze Nash equilibrium in a qualitative way [16] . On the other hand, as far as we know, (probabilistic) process algebra approach focus on verifying network security protocols. For example, in the earlier 1980's, a simple version of the alternating bit protocol in ACPτ (Algebra of Communicating Processes with silent actions) was verified [2] . For describing and analyzing cryptographic protocols, the spi calculus, an extension of the π calculus, was designed [1] . Recently, a generalization of the bisimilarity pseudo-metric based on the Kantorovich lifting is proposed, this metric allows to deal with a wider class of properties such as those used in security and privacy [3] .
In this paper, we propose a probabilistic value-passing CCS (PVCCS) approach for modeling and analyzing a typical network security scenario with one attacker and one defender. A network system is supposed to be composed of three participants: one attacker, one defender and the network environment which is the hardware and software services of the network under consideration. We consider all possible behaviors of the participants at each state of the system as processes and assign each state with a process describing all possible interactions currently performed among the participants. In this way we establish a network state transition model, often called reactive model in the literature [22] , based on PVCCS. By minimizing this model with respect to probabilistic bisimulation and abstracting it via graph-theoretic methods, two algorithms based on backward induction are designed to compute Nash Equilibrium Strategy (NES) [11, 8, 20] and Social Optimal Strategy (SOS) [14, 6] respectively. The former represents a stable strategy of which neither the attacker nor the defender is willing to change the current situation, and the latter is the policy to minimize the damages caused by the attacker. For each algorithm, the correctness is proved and an implementation is realized. This approach is illustrated by a detailed case study on an example introduced in [12] . The example describes a local network connected to Internet under the assumption that the firewall is unreliable, and the operating system on the machine is insufficiently hardening, and the attacker has chance to pretend as a root user in web server, stealing or damaging data stored in private file server and private workstation. The major contributions of our work are:
• establish a reactive model based on PVCCS for a typical network security scenario which is usually modeled via perfect and complete information games.
• minimize the state space of network system via probabilistic bisimulation and abstract it via graph-theoretic methods. This allows us to reduce the search space and hence considerably optimize the complexity of the concerned algorithms.
• propose two algorithms to compute Nash Equilibrium and Social Optimal strategy respectively. The novelty consists in combing graph-theoretic methods with backward induction, which enables us on the one hand to increase reuseness and on the other hand to make the backward induction possible in the setting of some infinite paths.
Note that our method can filter out invalid Nash Equilibrium strategies from the results obtained by traditional game-theoretic methods. For instance, in the example introduced in [12] , three Nash Equilibrium strategies obtained ultimately by game-theoretic approach methods, while only two of them obtained by our method: we filter out the invalid Nash Equilibrium strategy from the results in [12] . Note also our method can be applied to other network security scenarios. For example, the proposed reactive model can be extended conservatively to a generative model based on PVCCS. In this way we provide a uniform framework for modeling and analyzing network security scenarios which are usually modeled either via perfect and complete information games or via perfect and incomplete games. However, for the limited space of this paper, we will focus on the reactive setting for the conciseness and easier understanding of this work.
In the remaining sections, we shall review some notions of graph theory and establish the reactive model based on PVCCS (Section 2); present the formal definitions of NES and SOS in this model, as well as the corresponding algorithms and their correctness proofs (Section 3); then illustrate our method by a case study (Section 4); fianlly, discuss the conclusion (Section 5). Appendix shows proofs of theorems, tables referred to the case study and a notation index.
PRELIMINARIES AND REACTIVE MODEL BASED ON PVCCS 2.1 Graph theory
We firstly recall some notions of graph theory: Strongly Connected Component (SCC), Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) and Path Contraction [5, 19, 6] .
SCC of an arbitrary directed graph form a partition into subgraphs that are themselves strongly connected (it is possible to reach any vertex starting from any other vertex by traversing edges in the direction).
DAG is a directed graph with no directed cycles. There are two useful DAG related properties we used in our paper: (1) if H is a weakly connected graph, H is obtained by viewing each SCC in H as one vertex, H must be a DAG; (2) if H is a DAG, H has at least one vertex whose out-degree is 0.
Path Contraction Let e = xy be an edge of a graph H = (V, E). H/e is a graph (V , E ) with vertex set V := (V \{x, y}) ∪ {ve}, and edge set E := {vw ∈ E | {v, w} ∩ {x, y} = ∅} ∪ {vew | xw ∈ E\{e} or yw ∈ E\{e}} ( Figure  1 ). Path contraction occurs upon the set of edges in a path that contract to form a single edge between the endpoints of the path after a series of edge contractions. 
PVCCSR
PVCCS R is a reactive model for Probabilistic Value-passing CCS, proposed based on the reactive model for probabilistic CCS [22] .
Syntax: Let A be a set of channel names ranged over by a, and A be the set of co-names, i.e., A = {a | a ∈ A}, and a = a by convention. Label = A ∪ A. Var is a set of value variables ranged over by x and Val is a value set ranged over by v. e and b denote value expression and boolean expression respectively. The set of actions, ranged over by α, Act = {a(x) | a ∈ A} ∪ {a(e) | a ∈ A} ∪ {τ }, where τ is the silent action. K and X are a set of process identifiers and a set of process variables respectively. Each process identifier A ∈ K is assigned an arity, a non-negative integer representing the number of parameters which it takes.
Pr is the set of processes in PVCCS R defined inductively as follows, where P , Pi are already in Pr:
where a ∈ Label, R ⊆ A. I, J are index sets, and ∀i ∈ I, pij ∈ (0, 1],˙ j∈I pij = 1, and αi = αj if i = j.
and˙ are summation notations for processes and real numbers respectively. Furthermore, each process constant A(x) is defined recursively by associating to each identifier an equation of the form A(x) def = P , where P contains no process variables and no free value variables except x. N il is an empty process which does nothing; i∈I j∈J
[pij]αi.Pij is a summation process with probabilistic choice which means if performs action αi, Pij will be chosen to be proceed with probability pij, for example, [0.2]α.P1 + [0.8]α.P2 + [1] β.P3 is a process which will choose process P1 with probability 0.2 and P2 with probability 0.8 if performs action α, or will choose P3 with probability 1 if performs action β, here αi stands for an action prefix and there are two kinds of prefixes: input prefix a(x) and output prefix a(e). If J is a singleton set, then we will omit the probability from the summation process, such as i∈I j∈J [1] αi.Pij will be written as i∈I αi.Pi, and if both I and J are singleton sets, then the summation process is written as α.P ; P1|P2 represents the combined behavior of P1 and P2 in parallel; P \R is a channel restriction, whose behavior is like that of P as long as P does not perform any action with channel a ∈ R ∪ R; if b then P1 else P2 is a conditional process which enacts P1 if b is true, else P2.
Semantics:
The operational semantics of PVCCS R is defined by the rules in Table 1 , where
→ Q describes a transition that, by performing an action α, starts from P and leads to Q with probability p. Mapping chan : Act → A, i.e., chan(a(x)) = chan(a(e)) = a. And P {e/x} means substituting e for every free occurrences of x in process P . → P3, then we use
=⇒ P3 to represent multi-step transition.
Probabilistic Bisimulation: We recall the definition of cumulative probability distribution function (cPDF) [22] which computes the total probability in which a process derives a set of processes. ℘ is the powerset operator and we write Pr/R to denote the set of equivalence classes induced by equivalence relation R over Pr.
is the total function given by: ∀α ∈ Act, ∀P ∈ Pr, ∀C ⊆ Pr,
Definition 2.2. An equivalence relation R ⊆ Pr × Pr is a probabilistic bisimulation if (P, Q) ∈ R implies: ∀C ∈ Pr/R, ∀α ∈ Act, µ(P, α, C) = µ(Q, α, C).
P and Q are probabilistic bisimilar, written as P ∼ Q, if there exists a probabilistic bisimulation R s.t. P RQ.
Modelling for Network Security based on PVCCSR
ComModel focuses on modeling the network security scenario modeled usually via perfect and complete information game: a network system state considers the situations of attacker, defender and network environment together; the participants act in turn at each state and the interactions among the participants will cause the network state transition with certain probability; each state transition produces immediate payoff to attacker and defender, and the former (positive values) is in terms of the extent of damage he does to the network while the latter (negative values) is measured by the time of recovery; the future offensive-defensive behaviors will impact on the action choice of attacker and defender at each state. Nash Equilibrium strategy represents a stable plan of action for attacker and defender in long run, while the Social Optimal strategy is a policy to minimize the damage caused by attacker.
Assuming S is the set of network system state, ranged over by si, i ∈ I, I is an index set; action sets of attacker and defender are A a and A d respectively, u, v represent the general values, A a (si) ⊆ A a is the action set of attacker at si, as well as
is that of defender; state transition probability is a functionṗ :
, and immediate payoff associated with each transition is a functionṙ :
where R is the real number set, and we use index to distinguish the first and the second element, andṙ
ComModel, a model based on PVCCSR, is used to modeling for the network security scenario depicted as above. The processes represent all possible behaviors of the participants in network system at each state. Each state is assigned with a process depicting all possible interactions currently performed among the participants. Then we establish a network state transition system based on the process transitions.
In ComModel, the channel set A = {Attc, Defd, T ella,
Var is the set of value variables. Act is the union of behavior sets of the three participants (Act a ,Act d and Act n ) defined as follows: Figure 2 shows one interaction among the participants at state s. Attc(u) means attacker takes attack u, similar to Defd(v) for defender; Attc(x) (or Defd(x)) means network environment is attacked (or is defended); T ell d (x) (or T ella(x)) means network environment informs defender (or attacker) the action chosen by attacker (or defender); T ell d (x) (or T ella(x)) means defender (or attacker) is informed that 
Figure 2:
Interactions among participants at state s attack (or defense) has happened; Log(x, y) means the network environment writes the values of x and y into a log file, where x and y is used to receive the values of attack and defense respectively; Rec(ṙ(s, u, v)) stands for the network environment records the immediate payoff to attacker and defender if they choose u and v at state s respectively.
The processes describing all possible behaviors of the participants at state si, denoted by pA i , pD i and pN i , are defined as follows:
Attc(u).T ella(y).N il
The process assigned to each state si is defined as
We get the network state transition system, TS for short, based on process transitions. Minimizing TS by shrinking probabilistic bisimilar pairs of states. We conduct a series of path contractions on TS and obtained a new graph named as ConTS without information loss as follows:
• V = {Gi | Gi is the process we assign to state si}
WeiP (eij)| denotes the sum of absolute weight pair of eij. By convention, in any network security scenario, for any e, e ∈ E, if L
ANALYZING PROPERTIES AS GRAPH THEORY APPROACH
We firstly introduce the definitions of Nash Equilibrium strategy (NES ) and Social Optimal strategy (SOS ) in our model, and then we illustrate the algorithms proposed to comput NES and SOS respectively.
NES and SOS
Definition 3.1. ∀Gi ∈ V , an execution of Gi in ConTS, denoted by πi, is a walk (vertices and edges appearing alternately) starting from Gi and ending with a cycle, on which every vertex's out-degree is 1.
According to the definition of execution, πi is in the form of GieijGj...(G k ...G l e lk G k ) which is ended by a cycle starting with G k , where Gi and G k may be the same node. πi can be written as π e i if e is the first edge of πi; πi[j] denotes the subsequence of πi starting from Gj, where Gj is a vertex on πi.
Definition 3.2. The payoff to attacker and defender on execution πi, denoted by P F a (πi) and P F d (πi) respectively, are defined as follows:
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. The sum of absolute payoff on πi of attacker and defender is denoted as P F S (πi),
Theorem 3.1. ∀Gi ∈ V , πi is an execution of Gi, P F a (πi) and P F d (πi) are converged.
Proof. Based on the definition of payoff on an execution of Gi and limiting laws, we show the proof details for P F a (πi) in Appendix. The proof for P F d (πi) is similar.
Nash Equilibrium Execution and Social Optimal Execution are defined coinductively [18] as follows:
where πj is NEE of Gj, e is the first edge of πi, E
Act (e)} including e, and E (Gi) = {arg max
where πj is SOE of Gj Definition 3.5. Strategy is a sequence consisting of action pair (one from attacker and one from defender) at each state.
Definition 3.6. Nash Equilibrium Strategy (NES) is a strategy of which every Gi's execution based on is NEE of Gi.
Definition 3.7. Social Optimal Strategy (SOS) is a strategy of which every Gi's execution based on is SOE of Gi.
Algorithms
The way to compute NES (or SOS) in ConTS is to find a spanning subgraph of ConTS satisfying following conditions: A. Each vertex's outdegree is 1; B. Each vertex's execution in this subgraph is its NEE (or SOE).
For backward inductive analysis, we firstly find SCC of ConTS based on Tarjan's algorithm [5] and construct Abstraction (Abs for short) by viewing each SCC as one vertex. V(Abs) denotes the vertex set of Abs ranged over by D. Abs is a DAG, and we rename D with Leave if its out-degree is 0, else with Non-Leave. By convention, ∀D ∈ V(Abs), V(D) = {Gi ∈ V | Gi belongs to the SCC represented by D}.
Definition 3.8. ∀D ∈ V(Abs) 
NES in Leave:
The method of finding NES for Leave D is a value iteration method, denoted as NESinLeave(D). The value function is BackInd(Gi) which returns some edge e of Gi and RefN(Gi) is used to refresh the value of the weight pair for each edge of Gi, ∀Gi ∈ V(D).
As the narrative convenience, we introduce some auxiliary symbols: ∀e ∈ E(Gi), the weight pair initializes with L0(e) = L WeiP (e), and Ln(e) = (L a n (e), L d n (e)) is used to keep the new weight pair of e obtained by RefN(Gi) on the nth iteration; ∀Gi ∈ V(D), P pn(Gi) = (P p a n (Gi), P p d n (Gi)), initialized with P p0(Gi) = (0, 0), is used to keep Ln(e), where e is the result of BackInd(Gi) on the nth iteration. The iterative process will be continued until ∀Gi ∈ V(D), P pn(Gi) = P pn+1(Gi).
The framework of NESinLeave(D) is as follows: (1) Value iteration initializes with BackInd(Gi), where for each Gi ∈ V(D), the weight pair of e ∈ E(Gi) is L0(e). Assuming e is the result obtained by BackInd(Gi), then P p0(Gi) = L0(e); (2) Loops through the method RefN(Gi) and BackInd(Gi) by order until ∀Gi, P pn+1(Gi) = P pn(Gi); (3) ∀Gi, execute BackInd(Gi). The cycle obtained is what we want.
Rules of method BackInd(Gi) on the nth iteration, n ≥ 0:
, refresh E by filtering the edge e = arg max
n (e); (3) Refresh E by keeping edge e = arg max e∈E L a n (e) (4) Return e.
Rules in method RefN(Gi) on the (n+1)th iteration, n ≥ 0: (1) ∀e ∈ E(Gi), compute its Ln+1(e) componentwise by following formula:
Pseudo code of NESinLeave(), BackInd() and RefN() are shown in Algorithm 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
while ∃Gi is NonConducted do e ← BackInd(Gi); P p0(Gi) ← L0(e); Label Gi with Conducted; end while ∃Gi P pn(Gi) = P pn+1(Gi) componentwise do RefN(Gi) ; e ← BackInd(Gi);
Algorithm 2: Pseudo code of NESinLeave()
end e ← arg max e∈E {L a n (e)}; return e; Algorithm 3: Pseudo code of BackInd() 
SOS in Leave:
The method SOSinLeave(D) used to find SOS for Leave D is also a value iteration method. The value function is LocSoOp(Gi) which returns some edge e of Gi and RefS(Gi) is used to refresh the absolute sum value of the weight pair for each edge of Gi, ∀Gi ∈ V(D).
Here are some other auxiliary symbols for convenience: ∀e ∈ E(Gi), its sum of absolute weight pair initializes with L S 0 (e) = L S WeiP (e), and L S n (e) is used to keep the new sum of absolute weight pair of e obtained by RefS(Gi) on the nth iteration; P sn(Gi) initialized with P s0(Gi) = 0, is used to keep L S n (e), where e is the result of LocSoOp(Gi) on the nth iteration. The iterative process will be continued until ∀Gi ∈ V(D), P sn(Gi) = P sn+1(Gi).
The framework of SOSinLeave(D) is as follows:
(1) Value iteration initializes with LocSoOp(Gi), where for Gi ∈ V(D), the sum of absolute weight pair of e ∈ E(Gi) is L S 0 (e). Assuming the result obtained by LocSoOp(Gi) is e, then P s0(Gi) = L S 0 (e); (2) Loops through the method RefS(Gi) and LocSoOp(Gi) by order until ∀Gi, P sn+1(Gi) = P sn(Gi); (3) ∀Gi, execute LocSoOp(Gi). The cycle obtained is what we want.
Rules of method LocSoOp(Gi) on nth iteration, n ≥ 0: (1) Compare L S n (e), ∀e ∈ E(Gi); (2) Return edge e = arg min
Rules of method RefS(Gi) on (n+1)th iteration, n ≥ 0: (1) ∀eij ∈ E(Gi), compute its L S n+1 (eij) by following formula:
Pseudo code of SOSinLeave(), LocSoOp() and RefS() are given in Algorithm 5, 6 and 7 respectively. NES/SOS for Non-Leave NES of Non-Leave: For Non-Leave vertex D in Abs, the method of computing its NES is NESinNonLeave(D) and its framework is as follows:
0 (e); Label Gi with Conducted; end while ∃Gi P sn(Gi) = P sn+1(Gi) do RefS(Gi) ; e ← LocSoOp(Gi);
Algorithm 5: Pseudo code of SOSinLeave() Data: Gi ∈ V(D) Result: edge e ∈ E(Gi) while ∃e ∈ E(Gi) is not compared do e ← arg min e∈E {L S n (e)}; end return e ; Algorithm 6: Pseudo code of LocSoOp() 
, where πj is social optimal execution of Gj; (2) Change e to be self-loop edge of Gi.
Pseudo code of SOSinNonLeave() and PreProS() is shown in Algorithm 10 and Algorithm 11 respectively in Appendix.
Algorithm 10: Pseudo code of SOSinNonLeave()
Algorithm 11: Pseudo code of PreProS()
Correctness of Algorithms
Correctness of NESinLeave() Inspired by a technique in dynamic programming which is called value-iteration [23, 20] , BackInd(D) is formalized as a mapping σ :
Gi with eij whose weight pair is refreshed by the rule componentwise:
According to the rules of NESinLeave(D), σ k+1 (Gi) = P p1(Gi(σ k )) for any Gi ∈ V(D). It is convenient to define the shorthand operator notation (T σ)(Gi) = P p1(Gi(σ)), that is T σ k = σ k+1 .
Lemma 3.1. For any Gi ∈ V(D), we have
Proof. We prove by contradiction for the first inequality in details. According to the rules in BackInd(Gi), we need to consider all possible results obtained by BackInd(Gi) on kth and (k+1)th iteration respectively. The details are shown in Appendix. The proof for the second inequality is similar.
Lemma 3.2. T is a contraction.
Proof. For any real vector − → x ∈ R J , J is an index set, let || − → x ||∞= maxj |xj|. According to Lemma 3.1, then we have
Therefore, we claim that ∃σ * , satisfying T σ * = σ * . Proof. We need to prove two issues:
2. The execution of Gi, ∀Gi ∈ V(D), based on the result of NESinLeave(D) is its nash equilibrium execution. The details are shown in Appendix.
Correctness of SOSinLeave()
The way to prove the correctness of SOSinLeave() is similar to that of NESinLeave(). We will give the outline of the proofs.
We can formalize LocSoOp(D) as a mapping α : V(D) → R, so on kth iteration, we have σ k (Gi) = P s k (Gi). RefS() defines a set of vertex {Gi(σ k ) | Gi(σ k ) denotes Gi with eij whose sum of absolute weight pair is refreshed by the rule:
It is convenient to define another shorthand operator notation (T σ )(Gi) = P s1(Gi(σ )), that is T σ k = σ k+1 . By the same way as Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, we can prove operator T is a contraction.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.4. T is a contraction.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.2. 
CASE STUDY
The details of the example we used can be found in [12] . It shows a local network connected to Internet (see Figure 3) . By the assumption that the firewall is unreliable, and the operating system on the machine is insufficiently hardened, the attacker has chance to pretend as a root user in web server and steal or damage data stored in private file server and private workstation. The state set S of example is shown in Figure 3 : Case study Table 3 ; A a , A d is given in Table 5 and Table 4 respectively; for convenience, we will mostly refer to the states and actions using their symbolic number; state transition probability is shown in Table 7 , in whichṗ(s1, 1, 2, s1) = P (1|1, 1, 2) ; the immediate payoff to attacker and defender at each state is shown in Table 6 , in whichṙ
, where · means any action available at current state.
Modeling for Case study
We modeling for state s1 in ComModel as example, then we have pA 1 , pD 1 , pN 1 as follows:
We find three pairs of states which are probabilistic bisimilar: s13 ∼ s15, s14 ∼ s16 and s17 ∼ s18. Figure 4 shows the ConTS of case study. 
Analyzing NES/SOS for Case study
We implement the algorithms using Java in Eclipse development environment on machine with 3.4GHz Inter(R) Core(TM) i72.99G RAM. We get two Nash Equlibrium Strategies and one Social Optimal strategy for our case study, shown in Figure 5 , 6, 7 respectively.
(1,*,0. We compare our results with those obtained in [12] by gametheoretic approach: (1) We filter the invalid Nash Equilibrium strategy from the results in [12] . We filter the action pair (φ, Remove Sniffer Detecor) at state s3 and the action pair (Instrall Sniffer Detector, Remove Compromised account restart ftpd) at s6 which obtained in the second Nash Equilibrium strategy in [12] but have no practical state transition. (2) We minimize the state space by probabilistic bisimulation while [12] focuses on the whole state set. Time consumed to compute Nash Equilibrium strategy and Social Optimal strategy for this example with our approach is shown in Table 2 . Although it is incomparable with the time consumed in [12] because of evaluating on different machine models, our approach should be faster theoretically.
ComModel
Nash Equilibrium Social Optimal Creation strategy strategy 2.8s 3.7s 1.4s Table 2 : Time consumed for example with our approach
CONCLUSION
We proposed a probabilistic value-passing CCS (PVCCS) approach for modeling and analyzing a typical network security scenario with one attacker and one defender which is usually modeled by perfect and complete information game. Extention of this method might provide uniform framework for modelling and analyzing network security scenarios which are usually modeled via different games. We designed two algorithms for computing Nash Equilibrium strategy and Social Optimal strategy based on this PVCCS approach and on graph-theoretic methods. Advantages of these algorithms are also discussed.
APPENDIX A. PROOFS OF THEOREMS
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. As vertex set V is finite, then any infinite execution πi of Gi is in form of Giei1G1...(G k ...G (k+m) e (k+m)k G k ) which means ending with a cycle starting with G k , and m is the number of vertex on this cycle except G k , then we have
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Assuming without loss of generality, 
Let us define two conditions: Cond 1: on kth iteration, e2 is kept by step (2) of BackInd(). Proof. We need to prove two issues: 1. NESinLeave(D) is terminated. The way to prove termination of NESinLeave(D) is to prove ∃k that after kth iteration, ∀Gi, P p k (Gi) = P p k+1 (Gi). According to Lemma 3.2, trivial; 2. The result of NESinLeave(D) is NES of D. ∀Gi ∈ V(D), assuming πi whose first edge is e is the execution of Gi based on the result obtained by NESinLeave(D), we need to prove π e i is NEE of Gi coinductively. As π e i is ended by a cycle, we just need to prove any e on π e i , e ∈ E(Gj), is the first edge of NEE of Gj. We prove edge e of Gi as example. If π e i is not NEE of Gi, according to the definition of NEE, there exists π 
B. TABLES OF CASE STUDY
To make paper self-contained, we list the data related in example created in [12] . 
